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Recalling the state of the art in the interpretation of quantum physics, this
paper emphasizes that one cannot simply add a collapse parameter to the
Schrödinger equation in order to solve the measurement problem. If one does
so, one is also committed to a primitive ontology of a configuration of matter
in physical space in order to have something in the ontology that constitutes
the determinate measurement outcomes. The paper then argues that in
the light of this consequence, the collapse postulate loses its attractiveness
in comparison to an ontology of persisting particles moving on continuous
trajectories according to a deterministic law.
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1 The state of the art: the measurement problem and beyond
The measurement problem is the central issue in the formulation and understanding of
any quantum theory, since it concerns the link between the theory and the data. The
standard set up of this problem for non-relativistic quantum mechanics (QM) is provided
by Maudlin (1995, p. 7):
(1) The wave-function of a system is complete, i.e. the wave-function specifies (di-
rectly or indirectly) all of the physical properties of a system.
(2) The wave-function always evolves in accord with a linear dynamical equation
(e.g. the Schrödinger equation).
(3) Measurements of, e.g., the spin of an electron always (or at least usually) have
determinate outcomes, i.e., at the end of the measurement the measuring device is
either in a state which indicates spin up (and not down) or spin down (and not up).
Any two of these propositions are consistent with one another, but the conjunction of
all three of them is inconsistent. This can be easily illustrated by means of Schrödinger’s
cat paradox (Schrödinger (1935), p. 812): if the cat is completely described by the wave
function and if the wave function always evolves according to the Schrödinger equation,
then, due to the linearity of this wave equation, superpositions and entangled states will
in general be preserved. Consequently, a measurement of the cat will in general not have
a determinate outcome: at the end of the measurement, the cat will not be in the state
of either being alive or being dead.
Hence, the measurement problem is not just a – philosophical – problem of the in-
terpretation of a given formalism. It concerns also the very formulation of a consistent
quantum theory. Even if one abandons (3), one has to put forward a formulation of
quantum physics that establishes a link with at least the appearance of determinate mea-
surement outcomes. If one retains (3), one has to develop a formulation of a quantum
theory that goes beyond a theory in which only a wave function and a linear dynamical
equation for the evolution of the wave function figure. Accordingly, the formulation of
a consistent quantum theory can be divided into many worlds theories, rejecting (3),
collapse theories, rejecting (2), and additional variable theories, rejecting (1).
However, research in the last decade has made clear that we do not face three equally
distinct possibilities to solve the measurement problem, but just two: the main dividing
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line is between endorsing (3) and rejecting it. If one endorses (3), the consequence is
not that one has to abandon either (1) or (2), but that one has to amend both (1) and
(2). Determinate measurement outcomes as described in (3) are outcomes occurring in
ordinary physical space, that is, in three-dimensional space or four-dimensional space-
time. Hence, endorsing (3) entails being committed to the existence of a determinate
configuration of matter in physical space that constitutes measurement outcomes (such
as a live cat, or an apparatus configuration that indicates spin up, etc.). If one does so,
one cannot stop at amending (2). The central issue then is not whether or not a collapse
term for the wave function has to be added to the Schrödinger equation, because even
with the addition of such a term, this equation still is an equation for the evolution of the
wave function, by contrast to an equation for the evolution of a configuration of matter
in physical space. Consequently, over and above the Schrödinger equation – however
amended – a law or rule is called for that establishes an explicit link between the wave
function and the configuration of matter in physical space. By the same token, (1) has
to be changed in such a way that reference is made to the configuration of matter in
physical space and not just the quantum state as encoded in the wave function.
Here and in the following, the configuration of matter in physical space is intended to
be the entire configuration of matter of the universe at a given time (recall that we are
concerned with non-relativistic QM); accordingly, the wave function is intended to be
the universal wave function, that is, the wave function of the entire universe. In other
words, the quantum theory we are after is a universal theory – that is, a theory whose
laws apply to the entire universe –, like classical mechanics. It is of course not the final
theory, again like classical mechanics.
In the literature, the configuration of matter in physical space is known as the prim-
itive ontology of quantum physics.1 There are three proposals to spell out what that
configuration is:
1. Point particles that consequently always have a determinate position in physical
space (there cannot be point particles in physical space without these particles
being located somewhere in that space, independently of whether or not we are
able to determine that location). The corresponding quantum theory is Bohmian
mechanics (BM), which adds particle positions to the quantum state as given by
the wave function and a law for the evolution of these positions to the Schrödinger
equation. That law is known as the guiding equation. The wave function figures
1This term goes back to Dürr et al. (2013b, ch. 2), originally published 1992. A forerunner of this
notion can be found in Mundy (1989, p. 46). Cf. also Bell’s notion of “local beables” in Bell (2004,
ch. 7), originally published 1975.
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in that law, its job being to determine the velocity of the particles at a time t,
given their positions at t. This theory goes back to de Broglie (1928) and Bohm
(1952). Its dominant contemporary version is the one of Dürr et al. (2013b) (and
see the textbook Dürr and Teufel (2009)).
2. A matter density field that stretches all over physical space, having varying de-
grees of density at different points or regions of space. The corresponding quantum
theory is the GRW matter density theory (GRWm), which uses the collapse for-
malism of Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber (Ghirardi et al. (1986)) in the version of a
continuous spontaneous localization (CSL) of the wave function in configuration
space (Ghirardi et al. (1990)). It establishes a link between the wave function in
configuration space and the matter in physical space in such a way that the wave
function and its evolution according to the GRW-CSL equation describe a wave
or field filling all of physical space and the evolution of that field in physical space
(Ghirardi et al. (1995)).
3. Isolated point events in physical space, called “flashes”. These flashes are ephemeral.
They do not stretch beyond the space-time point at which they occur. The corre-
sponding quantum theory is the GRW flash theory (GRWf), which uses the original
collapse formalism of Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber (Ghirardi et al. (1986)) with the
wave function making occasionally jumps so that it undergoes a spontaneous local-
ization in configuration space. A rule then is added to the GRW equation stating
that whenever a spontaneous localization of the wave function occurs in configura-
tion space, a flash shows up at a point in physical space. The flash theory has been
proposed as an ontology of the GRW formalism by Bell (2004, ch. 22, originally
published 1987). The term “flash” was coined by Tumulka (2006, p. 826).
Despite their differences, these three quantum theories have a number of important
features in common (Allori et al. (2008) were the first to work out their common struc-
ture). In the first place, (a) they are all committed to the matter in physical space
being primitive objects. That is to say, these objects do not have any physical proper-
ties over and above their being localized in physical space. Hence, by contrast to what
one can maintain about classical particles, these objects cannot be considered as having
an intrinsic mass or an intrinsic charge (or an intrinsic spin)2. They do not have any
intrinsic properties. As regards BM, experimental considerations involving interference
phenomena – for instance in the context of the Aharonov-Bohm effect and of certain
2See Bell (2004, ch. 4), originally published 1971, and Norsen (2014) for the Bohmian treatment of
spin. Similar remarks apply to the GRWm and GRWf theories.
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interferometry experiments – show, in brief, that mass and charge are effective at all
the possible particle locations that the wave function admits; they can hence not be
considered as properties that are localized at the Bohmian particle positions (see e.g.
Brown et al. (1995, 1996) and references therein; cf. also most recently Pylkkänen et al.
(2015)). In brief, any property that one may contemplate attributing to the particles
over and above their position is in fact situated at the level of their quantum state as
represented by the wave function instead of being a candidate for an intrinsic property
of the particles. The same goes for the flash-events on the GRWf theory. When it comes
to the GRWm theory, the matter density field is a primitive stuff filling all of space,
which admits different degrees of density as a primitive matter of fact, but which has no
further physical properties, as Allori et al. (2014) point out:
Moreover, the matter that we postulate in GRWm and whose density is given by
the m function does not ipso facto have any such properties as mass or charge; it
can only assume various levels of density. (Allori et al. (2014), pp. 331–332)
Furthermore, (b) the fact that all the primitive ontology theories of quantum physics
infringe upon proposition (1) of the measurement problem comes out clearly when one
enquires into their consequences for our knowledge: as Cowan and Tumulka (2016) es-
tablish, not only the Bohmian particle positions – and hence the particle trajectories
– are not always accessible to an observer, but also the GRWm matter density field
and the GRWf flash distribution are not entirely accessible to an observer, although
the latter are specified by the wave function, whereas the Bohmian particle positions
are not specified by the wave function. Hence, one does not avoid what may seem to
be a drawback of subscribing to so-called hidden variables, namely a limited epistemic
accessibility, by amending the Schrödinger equation and taking the wave function as it
figures in such an amended Schrödinger equation to represent the configuration of mat-
ter in physical space. In a nutshell, if one is committed to a configuration of matter in
physical space in quantum physics, one also has to endorse a commitment to a limited
epistemic accessibility of that configuration, in whatever way one spells out the theory
of that configuration and its evolution.
By way of consequence, (c) probabilities enter into any primitive ontology theory of
QM through our ignorance of the exact configuration of matter in physical space. This
ignorance implies that we immediately have to resort to probabilistic descriptions in
QM, independently of whether the dynamical law for the evolution of the configuration
of matter in physical space is deterministic (as in Bohmian mechanics) or stochastic (as in
the GRW theory) (see e.g. Oldofredi et al. (2016) on that introduction of probabilities).
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Finally, (d) endorsing a primitive ontology theory of quantum physics does not commit
us to subscribing to an ontological dualism of matter in physical space (the primitive
ontology, consisting in primitive objects) and the quantum state (the wave function) in
configuration space. Such a dualism would be highly implausible; for instance, it would
be unintelligible how a wave function, being a field on configuration space, could interact
with matter in physical space by influencing its motion. There are several proposals in
the literature how to conceive the wave function in the primitive ontology framework
that all avoid such an implausible dualism: (i) The most straightforward proposal is
to ban the wave function as an additional entity from the ontology altogether. The
claim thus is that the primitive ontology is the entire ontology. Given the spatial dis-
tribution of the elements of the primitive ontology throughout the whole history of the
universe, the universal wave function and its evolution is part of the best descriptive
system, that is, the system that achieves the best balance between being simple and be-
ing informative about that distribution. The wave function hence has only a descriptive
role by contrast to an ontological one. This stance is known as quantum Humeanism.
It has been worked out in the philosophy literature mainly by taking BM as an ex-
ample (Miller (2014), Esfeld (2014b), Callender (2015), Bhogal and Perry (2016)), but
there also exists a concrete model in the physics literature that uses the GRWf theory
(Dowker and Herbauts (2005)). (ii) When one admits the wave function to the ontology,
one can still regard it as referring to an entity in physical space. The most prominent
proposal in that respect in the philosophical literature is to take the wave function to re-
fer to dispositions of the elements of the primitive ontology for a certain evolution under
certain circumstances, namely either one holistic disposition of the entire configuration
(Esfeld et al. (2014)), or a multitude of dispositions of each individual element whose
manifestations depend on the other elements (Suárez (2015)). (iii) The corresponding
proposal in the physics literature, conceiving the wave function as an entity in physical
space, is the one of regarding it either as a multi-field in physical space – that is, a field
that attributes a value not to single space-time points, but only to an entire bunch of
them (Forrest (1988), ch. 6.2) – or as referring to a multitude of fields associated with
each element of the primitive ontology (such as each Bohmian particle) (Norsen et al.
(2015)).
Given this state of the art, the next task then is to evaluate the theories that solve the
measurement problem by being committed to a primitive ontology of matter distributed
in physical space. That is, one seeks for an answer to the following two questions: What
is best proposal for the physical objects? What is best proposal for the dynamics? This
paper sets out to answer these two questions (see also Esfeld (2014a)).
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2 What is best proposal for the physical objects?
Atomism is the oldest and most influential tradition in natural philosophy, going back
to the pre-Socratic philosophers Leucippus and Democritus and having been turned into
a precise physical theory by Newton. Atomism offers a clear and simple explanation
of the realm of our experience. Macroscopic objects are composed of point particles.
All the differences between the macroscopic objects – at a time as well as in time –
are accounted for in terms of the spatial configuration of these particles and its change,
which is subject to certain laws. That is why Feynman famously writes at the beginning
of the Feynman lectures on physics:
If, in some cataclysm, all of scientific knowledge were to be destroyed, and only
one sentence passed on to the next generations of creatures, what statement would
contain the most information in the fewest words? I believe it is the atomic hy-
pothesis (or the atomic fact, or whatever you wish to call it) that all things are
made of atoms – little particles that move around in perpetual motion, attracting
each other when they are a little distance apart, but repelling upon being squeezed
into one another. In that one sentence, you will see, there is an enormous amount
of information about the world, if just a little imagination and thinking are applied.
(Feynman et al. (1963), ch. 1-2)
When it comes to quantum physics, atomism – that is, an ontology of permanent
particles moving on continuous trajectories – is implemented in BM. What changes in
BM with respect to classical mechanics is the law of motion for these particles, namely
a non-local law that takes quantum entanglement into account.
There are three main reasons to take an ontology of particles to be the best proposal
also in the domain of quantum physics: (i) In the first place, also in this domain, all
experimental evidence is evidence of discrete objects (i.e. particles) – from dots on a
display to traces in a cloud chamber. Entities that are not particles – such as waves
or fields – come in as figuring in the explanation of the behaviour of the particles, but
they are not themselves part of the experimental evidence. For instance, the double
slit experiment is made apparent by particles hitting on a screen. (ii) The argument
from composition is not touched by the transition from classical to quantum physics:
from the chemical elements on to all macroscopic objects, everything is composed of
elementary quantum particles. (iii) Consequently, all other proposals are parasitic on
the particle proposal: even if they do not admit particles in the ontology – such as
the GRWm theory –, their formalism for QM works in terms of a fixed number of N
permanent particles, which defines the configuration space; its dimension is 3N , with
each point of that space corresponding to a possible particle configuration in physical
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space. Hence, these other proposals have to interpret a particle configuration formalism
as not representing a particle configuration.
However, why should one retain particles and thus trajectories in the light of the
evidence from quantum physics? The mentioned arguments speak in favour of an on-
tology of discrete objects, but one may wonder whether this has to be an ontology of
particles. The GRWf ontology of single, discrete events can be considered as a parti-
cle ontology without the trajectories so that what remains of the particles are isolated
events in space-time. However, the three above mentioned arguments can be adapted
in such a way that they single out particles over flashes: (iii) applies not only to the
GRWm ontology, but also to the GRWf ontology: the flashes are discontinuous, and
there is no intertemporal identity of them, since the flashes do not persist in time. But
the formalism is based on a fixed number of persistent particles. (ii) This observation
applies also to the argument from composition: there is nothing in the GRWf ontology
that could ground the intertemporal identity of macroscopic objects.
As regards (i), it is true that the particle evidence in quantum physics is evidence of
discrete objects, which could be point events like point particles. But the evidence of
discrete objects in physical space is not evidence of a physical space into which discrete
objects are inserted; it is evidence only of relative positions of discrete objects, that
is, distances among discrete objects. However, by renouncing on persisting objects, the
GRWf ontology is committed to the existence of an absolute background space into which
the flashes are inserted and an absolute background time in which the flashes show up
(there can even be times at which there are no flashes at all in the universe). By contrast,
although BM is usually also formulated in terms of the particles moving in a background
space and a background time, the ontological commitment to a background space and
time can be dispensed with in BM. The ontology of BM can be conceived only in terms
of distance relations among particles that change, with the representation of that change
in terms of particle trajectories in a background space and time being only a means of
representation of the primitive ontology instead of implying the ontological commitment
to an absolute space and time (see Vassallo et al. (2016) and Vassallo and Ip (2016)).
By the same token, one can regard the universal wave function in BM as a means of
representation only instead of as an element of the ontology over and above the particles,
as mentioned at the end of the preceding section.
The ontology of matter being one continuous stuff, known as gunk, that fills all of space
is as old as the ontology of atomism, going back to the Presocratic natural philosophers
as well. This view does not have to commit itself to points, neither to material points
nor to points of space (see Arntzenius and Hawthorne (2005)). It is hence not tied to
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endorsing an absolute background space: it can be construed as being committed to a
continuous stuff that is extended, but not to an absolute space that is distinct from that
stuff and into which that stuff is inserted.
In order to accommodate variation, gunk cannot be conceived as being homogeneous
throughout space. To take variation into account, one has to maintain that there is more
stuff in some parts of space and less stuff in others. Atomism conceptualizes variation
in terms of different distances among the discrete point particles so that some particles
are situated close to one another, whereas others are further apart: there are clusters of
point particles with distances among them that are smaller than the distances that these
particles bear to particles outside such a cluster. By contrast, the gunk ontology cannot
accommodate variation throughout space in terms of the concentration of primitive point
particles. It therefore faces this question: What constitutes the fact of there being more
matter in some regions of space and less matter in others?
The view of matter being gunk has to acknowledge as a further primitive a variation of
the density of gunk throughout space with gunk being more dense in some parts of space
and less dense in other parts. That is to say, gunk admits of degrees, as expressed by the
m function in the GRWm formalism: there is more stuff in some parts of space than in
others, with the density of matter in the parts of space changing in time; otherwise, the
theory would not be able to accommodate variation. Formally, one can represent the
degrees of density in terms of attributing a value of matter density to the points of space
(the m function as evaluated at the points of space), although the matter density stuff,
being gunk, is infinitely divisible, and this ontology is not committed to the existence of
points of space. The main problem is that it remains unclear what could constitute the
difference in degrees of stuff at points of space, if matter just is primitive stuff. The gunk
theory thus is committed to the view of matter being a bare substratum with its being
a primitive fact that this substratum has various degrees of density in different parts of
space. In a nutshell, there is a primitive stuff-essence of matter that furthermore admits
of different degrees of density. In comparison to the gunk view of matter, atomism is the
simpler and clearer proposal for an ontology of fundamental physics, because it avoids
the dubious commitment to a bare substratum or primitive stuff-essence of matter with
different degrees of density.
It seems that QM favours a particle ontology, given that the formalism is conceived in
terms of a fixed number of permanent particles, but that quantum field theory (QFT)
clearly favours the view of matter being a field and thus one continuous stuff filling all
of space instead of discrete objects. However, a quantum field never is a field in the
sense of a continuous entity filling space that has definite values at the points of space.
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The fields figuring in the textbook formalism of QFT are operator valued fields, that is,
mathematical objects employed to calculate probabilities for obtaining certain measure-
ment outcomes at certain points of space if certain procedures are applied. They hence
do not represent properties that occur at points of space or space-time. No ontology can
be built on operator valued fields. As regards the experimental evidence, the remarks
above apply, namely that also in the domain of QFT, all the experimental evidence is
one of discrete objects, such as particle traces in a cloud chamber. When it comes to the
wave function, again, like in QM, it is a field on configuration space and not a continuous
stuff in physical space.
Consequently, the measurement problem hits QFT in the same way as QM (see Barrett
(2014)). In particular, there is no relativistic theory of measurement. Consequently,
problems that primitive ontology theories of quantum physics may face with respect to
relativistic physics cannot be counted as an argument against these theories: they solve
the measurement problem, and no one has produced a solution to this problem that
(a) acknowledges determinate measurement outcomes and (b) is a relativistic theory of
interactions, including in particular measurement interactions (see again Barrett (2014)).
BM has to rely on a privileged foliation of space-time into spatial hyersurfaces in its
ontology, which can be introduced through the universal wave function (see Dürr et al.
(2013a)). However, this foliation does not show up in the deduction of the statistics of
measurement outcomes from the dynamical laws. As regards GRWf and GRWm, there
are relativistic versions as long as one considers only a distribution of the elements of the
primitive ontology throughout the whole of space-time (see Tumulka (2006) for GRWf
and Bedingham et al. (2014) for GRWm), but no relativistic versions of interactions (see
Esfeld and Gisin (2014)).
The Bohmian solution of the quantum measurement problem works for QFT in the
same way as for QM: as it is a non sequitur to take particle trajectories to be ruled out in
QM due to the Heisenberg uncertainty relations, so it is a non sequitur to take permanent
particles moving on definite trajectories according to a deterministic law to be ruled out
in QFT due to the statistics of particle creation and annihilation phenomena. In both
cases, such an underlying particle ontology is in the position to explain the statistics
of measurement outcomes (see Colin and Struyve (2007) and Deckert et al. (2016) as to
how this is achieved in a Bohmian QFT in the framework of what is known as the Dirac
sea model). In brief, QFT does not change anything with respect to the evaluation of
the proposals for a primitive ontology of quantum physics: the arguments that favour a
particle ontology remain valid in the domain of QFT.
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Nonetheless, atoms qua point particles are theoretical entities. They are not seen by
the naked eye when one sees, for instance, dots on a screen as outcomes of the double
slit experiment. They are admitted because they provide the best explanation of the
observable facts. The simplicity and parsimony of this proposal are part of the case for
its being the best explanation. To put it in a nutshell, particle evidence is best explained
in terms of particle ontology. However, this explanation is not given by the ontology
of point particles alone, but by this ontology together with the dynamics that is put
forward to describe the motion of the particles: it is the dynamics that provides for the
stability of the macroscopic objects with which we are familiar. That is why assessing the
proposals for a primitive ontology of quantum physics depends not only on the ontology
put forward for the physical objects, but also on the dynamics that is conceived for these
objects.
3 What is best proposal for the dynamics?
BM is usually presented by formulating the laws of motion on the configuration space
R
3N , where N is the number of particles and x1, . . . , xk, . . . , xN ∈ R
3N represents their
positions at time t. The configuration then evolves according to the guiding equation
dxk
dt
= Im
~
mk
ψ∗∇kψ
ψ∗ψ
(x1, . . . , xN ), (1)
where ψ(x1, . . . , xn) is the wave-function representing the quantum state of the system
and Im denotes the imaginary part. The time-evolution of this wave-function, in turn,
is given by the Schrödinger equation
ı~
∂ψ
∂t
=
(
−
N∑
j=1
~
2
2mj
∆j + V (x1, . . . , xn)
)
ψ, (2)
familiar from standard QM. The non-local character of the guiding equation is manifested
in the fact that the velocity of any particle at time t depends on the position of every
other particle at time t; the law of motion, in other words, describes the evolution of the
particle configuration as a whole. This is necessary in order to take quantum non-locality
– as illustrated for instance by Bell’s theorem – into account.
In GRW, the evolution of the wave function Ψt is given by a modified Schrödinger
equation. The latter can be defined as follows: the wave function undergoes spontaneous
jumps in configuration space at random times distributed according to the Poisson dis-
tribution with rate Nλ. Between two successive jumps the wave function Ψt evolves
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according to the usual Schrödinger equation. At the time of a jump the kth component
of the wave function Ψt undergoes an instantaneous collapse according to
Ψt(x1, . . . , xk, . . . , xN ) 7→
(Lxxk)
1/2Ψt(x1, . . . , xk, . . . , xN )
‖(Lxxk)
1/2Ψt‖
, (3)
where the localization operator Lxxk is given as a multiplication operator of the form
Lxxk :=
1
(2piσ2)3/2
e
−
1
2σ2
(xk−x)
2
, (4)
and x, the centre of the collapse, is a random position distributed according to the
probability density p(x) = ‖(Lxxk)
1/2Ψt‖
2. This modified Schrödinger evolution captures
in a mathematically precise way what the collapse postulate in textbook QM introduces
by a fiat, namely the collapse of the wave function so that it can represent localized
objects in physical space, including in particular measurement outcomes. GRW thereby
introduce two additional parameters, the mean rate λ as well as the width σ of the lo-
calization operator, which can be regarded as new constants of nature whose values can
be inferred from (or are at least bounded by) experiments (such as chemical reactions
on a photo plate, double slit experiments, etc.). An accepted value of the mean rate λ
is of the order of 1015s−1. This value implies that the spontaneous localization process
for a single particle occurs only at astronomical time scales of the order of 1015s, while
for a macroscopic system of N ∼ 1023 particles, the collapse happens so fast that pos-
sible superpositions are resolved long before they would be experimentally observable.
Moreover, the value of σ can be regarded as localization width; an accepted value is of
the order of 10−7m. The latter is constrained by the overall energy increase of the wave
function of the universe that is induced by the localization processes.
However, as explained in the first section, modifying the Schrödinger equation is, by
itself, not sufficient to solve the measurement problem: to do so, one has to answer
the question of what the wave function and its evolution represent. One therefore has
to add to the GRW equation a link between the evolution of the mathematical object
Ψt in configuration space and the distribution of matter in physical space in order to
account for the outcomes of experiments and, in general, the observable phenomena.
Ghirardi et al. (1995) accomplish this task by taking the evolution of the wave function
in configuration space to represent the evolution of a matter density field in physical
space. This then constitutes the GRWm theory. It amounts to introduce in addition to
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Ψt and its time evolution a field mt(x) on physical space R
3 as follows:
mt(x) =
N∑
k=1
mk
∫
d3x1 . . . d
3xN δ
3(x− xk)|Ψt(x1, . . . , xN )|
2. (5)
This field mt(x) is to be understood as the density of matter in physical space R
3 at
time t (see Allori et al. (2008), section 3.1).
By introducing two new dynamical parameters – lambda and sigma – whose values
have to be put in by hand, the GRW theory abandons the simplicity and elegance of
the Schrödinger equation and the Bohmian guiding equation, without amounting to a
physical benefit (there is of course a benefit in comparison to stipulating the collapse
postulate by a simple fiat, but doing so is no serious theory). Indeed, there is an ongoing
controversy whether the GRWm ontology of a continuous matter density field that de-
velops according to the GRW equation is sufficient to solve the measurement problem.
The reason is the so-called problem of the tails of the wave function. This problem arises
from the fact that the GRW theory mathematically implements spontaneous localization
by multiplying the wave function with a Gaussian, such that the collapsed wave func-
tion, although being sharply peaked in a small region of configuration space, does not
actually vanish outside that region; it has tails spreading to infinity. In the literature
starting with Albert and Loewer (1996) and P. Lewis (1997), it is therefore objected that
the GRW theory does not achieve its aim, namely to describe measurement outcomes
in the form of macrophysical objects having a determinate position. However, there is
nothing indefinite about the positions of objects according to GRWm. It is just that an
(extremely small) part of each object’s matter is spread out through all of space. But
since the overwhelming part of any ordinary object’s matter is confined to a reasonably
small spatial region, we can perfectly well express this in our (inevitably vague) everyday
language by saying that the object is in fact located in that region (see Monton (2004),
pp. 418-419, and Tumulka (2011)). Thus, the GRWm ontology offers a straightforward
solution to what Wallace (2008, p. 56) calls the problem of bare tails.
However, there is another aspect, which is known as the problem of structured tails
(see Wallace (2008), p. 56). Consider a situation in which the pure Schrödinger evolution
would lead to a superposition with equal weight of two macroscopically distinct states
(such as a live and a dead cat). The GRW dynamics ensures that the two weights do not
stay equal, but that one of them (e.g. the one pertaining to the dead cat) approaches
unity while the other one becomes extremely small (but not zero). In terms of matter
density, we then have a high-density dead cat and a low-density live cat. The problem
is that it seems that the low-density cat is just as cat-like (in terms of shape, behaviour,
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etc.) as the high-density cat, so that in fact there are two cat-shapes in the matter
density field, one with a high and another one with a low density. There is an ongoing
controversy about this problem: Maudlin (2010, pp. 135-138) takes it to be a knock
down objection against the GRW matter density ontology, whereas others put forward
reasons that aim at justifying to dismiss the commitment to there being a low-density
that is as cat-like as the high-density cat in the matter density field (see notably Wallace
(2014), Albert (2015), pp. 150-154, and Egg and Esfeld (2015), section 3).
Be that as it may, there arguably is another, more important drawback of the GRW
dynamics that concerns the meaning of the spontaneous localization of the wave function
in configuration space for the evolution of the matter density field in physical space. To
illustrate this issue, consider a simple example, namely the thought experiment of one
particle in a box that Einstein presented at the Solvay conference in 1927 (the following
presentation is based on de Broglie’s version of the thought experiment in de Broglie
(1964), pp. 28-29, and on Norsen (2005)): the box is split in two halves which are
sent in opposite directions, say from Brussels to Paris and Tokyo. When the half-box
arriving in Tokyo is opened and found to be empty, there is on all accounts of QM that
acknowledge that measurements have outcomes a fact that the particle is in the half-box
in Paris.
On GRWm, the particle is a matter density field that stretches over the whole box and
that is split in two halves of equal density when the box is split, these matter densities
travelling in opposite directions. Upon interaction with a measurement device, one of
these matter densities (the one in Tokyo in the example given above) vanishes, while
the matter density in the other half-box (the one in Paris) increases so that the whole
matter is concentrated in one of the half-boxes. One might be tempted to say that
some matter travels from Tokyo to Paris; however, since it is impossible to assign any
finite velocity to this travel, the use of the term “travel” is inappropriate. For lack of
a better expression let us say that some matter is delocated from Tokyo to Paris (this
term has been proposed by Matthias Egg, see Egg and Esfeld (2014), p. 193); for even
if the spontaneous localization of the wave function in configuration space is conceived
as a continuous process as in Ghirardi et al. (1990), the time it takes for the matter
density to disappear in one place and to reappear in another place does not depend on
the distance between the two places. This delocation of matter, which is not a travel
with any finite velocity, is quite a mysterious process that the GRWm ontology asks us
to countenance.
On BM, by contrast, in this example, there always is one particle moving on a con-
tinuous trajectory in one of the two half-boxes, and opening one of them only reveals
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where the particle was all the time. In other words, BM provides a local account of the
case of the particle in a box. However, when moving from Einstein’s thought experiment
with one particle in a box (1927) to the EPR experiment (Einstein et al. (1935)), even
BM can no longer give a local account, as proven by Bell’s theorem (Bell (2004), ch.
2; see also notably chs. 7 and 24). On the GRWm theory, again, the measurement in
one wing of the experiment triggers a delocation of the matter density, more precisely
a change in its shape in both wings of the experiment, so that, in the version of the
experiment by Bohm (1951, pp. 611-622) the shape of the matter density constitutes
two spin measurement outcomes. On BM, fixing the parameter in one wing of the EPR
experiment influences the trajectory of the particles in both wings via the wave function
of the whole system, which consists of the measured particles as well as of the particles
that make up the measuring devices.
Hence, in this case, it clearly comes out that according to the Bohmian velocity equa-
tion (1), the velocity of any particle depends strictly speaking on the position of all the
other particles. However, each particle always moves with a determinate, finite velocity
that is not greater than the velocity of light so that its motion traces out a continuous
trajectory, without anything jumping – or being delocated – in physical space. The
best conjecture for a velocity field that captures this motion that we can make, namely
(1), requires acknowledging that the motions of these particles are correlated with each
other, but this does not imply a commitment to there being some spooky agent or force
in nature that instantaneously coordinates the motions of all the particles in the uni-
verse. Quantum physics just teaches us that it is a fact about the universe that when we
seek to write down a simple and general law that accounts for the empirical evidence,
we have to conceive a law that represents the motions of the particles to be correlated
with one another.
However, Einstein (1948) is certainly right in pointing out that a complete suspension
of the principles of separability and local action would make it impossible to do physics:
a theory that says that the motion of any object is effectively influenced by the position
of every other object in the configuration of matter of the universe would be empirically
inadequate and rule out any experimental investigation of nature. In order to meet Ein-
stein’s requirement, it is not necessary to rely on a collapse dynamics, as does GRW. BM
fulfills this condition because decoherence will in general destroy the entanglement be-
tween large and/or distant systems, allowing to treat them, for all practical purposes, as
evolving in an independent manner. Moreover, BM is able to recover classical behaviour
in the relevant regimes (see Dürr et al. (2013b), ch. 5). Since BM is a theory about
the motion of particles, this classical limit does not involve or require any change in the
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ontological commitment, but consists in the proposition that typical Bohmian trajec-
tories look approximately Newtonian on macroscopic scales (if the characteristic wave
length associated to ψ is small compared to the scale on which the interaction potential
varies). Altogether, the Bohmian theory, against the background of an ontology of point
particles that are characterized only by their relative positions and a dynamics for the
change of these positions, illustrates that there is nothing suspicious about a non-local
dynamics.
Let us turn now to GRWf. As mentioned in the preceding section, the flashes can
be conceived as Bohmian particles deprived of their trajectories, so that all that is left
are isolated point events in space-time. The main problem for this ontology is that the
flashes are too sparsely distributed. Consider what this means for the dynamics: the
account that the original GRW theory envisages for measurement interactions does not
work on the flash ontology – in other words, this ontology covers only the spontaneous
appearance and disappearance of flashes, but offers no account of interactions. On
the original GRW proposal, a measurement apparatus is supposed to interact with a
quantum object; since the apparatus consists of a great number of quantum objects, the
entanglement of the wave function between the apparatus and the measured quantum
object will be immediately reduced due to the spontaneous localization of the wave
function of the apparatus. However, even if one supposes that a measurement apparatus
can be conceived as a galaxy of flashes (but see the reservations of Maudlin (2011), pp.
257-258), there is on GRWf nothing with which the apparatus could interact: there is
no particle that enters it, no mass density and in general no field that gets in touch with
it either (even if one conceives the wave function as a field, it is a field in configuration
space and not a field in physical space where the flashes are). There only is one flash
(standing for what is usually supposed to be a quantum particle) in its past light cone,
but there is nothing left of that flash with which the apparatus could interact.
4 Conclusion
This paper has made evident that one cannot simply add a collapse parameter to the
Schrödinger equation in order to solve the measurement problem. If one does so, one
also has to specify a primitive ontology of a configuration of matter in physical space in
order to have something in the ontology that constitutes the determinate measurement
outcomes and that evolves as described by the modified Schrödinger equation. This then
is the important ingredient for the ontology and not the wave function, independently
of whether or not it undergoes collapses. As explained at the end of section 1, one can
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endorse the wave function as a parameter that figures centrally in the law of motion for
the primitive ontology, but nevertheless regard it only as a bookkeeping device of that
motion.
In the light of this consequence, the collapse principle loses its attractiveness. If one
needs a primitive ontology over and above the collapse postulate anyway, one can retain
a particle ontology and a deterministic law of motion for the particles with a universal
wave function that never collapses and deduce the QM probability calculus from that
law. Recall that, as mentioned in section 1, any primitive ontology implies that we do
not enjoy full epistemic accessibility to the configuration of matter, so that probabilities
come in anyway through our ignorance of the exact initial conditions, independently of
whether or not the law for the evolution of the wave function is stochastic. Of course,
this assessment would change if experimental tests of collapse theories like GRW against
theories that exactly produce the predictions of textbook QM – such as BM – were
carried out successfully and confirmed the collapse theories where they deviate from the
standard predictions (see Curceanu and alteri (2016) for such experiments).
As things stand, the arguments for the particle ontology notably are that all the ex-
perimental evidence is particle evidence, that all composed objects are made of particles
and that any QM formalism is conceived in terms of a definite number of persisting par-
ticles. As regards the dynamics, a law for the particle motion on continuous trajectories
such as the Bohmian guiding equation gives an account of the non-local correlations as
brought out by Bell’s theorem and the EPR experiment in terms of correlated particle
motion without anything ever jumping or being delocated in physical space.
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